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Abstract: The industrialization under a communist regime has some particularities 
generated by the state ownership, centralized administrative planning and, last but not 
least, by the communist leaders’ visions on the roles of industries. During the reign of 
Josef Stalin, who considered that major role in the economy had to be played by the heavy 
industries, in the Soviet Union there were built large industrial complexes where the former 
peasants were transformed in industrial workers. His successor, Nikita Khruhschev, who 
had a different vision on industrialization, assigned increasing roles to the consumer-
oriented industries and agriculture. He promoted also the specialization among the 
economies of Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. This new orientation met 
the opposition of Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej, the Romanian communist leader who 
initiated, since the late 1950s, a gradually emancipation from the Soviet tutelage. An 
episode of confrontation between the Romanian and Soviet communists on the industrial 
policies was the 1960 decision of building a gigantic steel mill at Galati, a town from the 
South – East of Romania where Gheorghiu - Dej spent his youth. Despite the De – 
Stalinization process launched in the Soviet Union in 1956, the Romanian communists’ 
initiative followed a Stalinist type of industrialization. Moreover, when the Soviet 
Government proposed, in the spirit of the division of labor within the socialist camp 
promoted by Khruhschev, that the new plant should transform in steel the pig iron 
produced by their industrial complexes, Romanian communists viewed this plan as a 
threat to the country’s economic development and they rejected it. This paper explores 
some circumstances of the decision on building of the new steel mill which dramatically 
changed the economic and social profile of Galati.  
Keywords: Industrialization under communist regimes; Economic development; 
Galati steel works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
From the perspectives of the economic development theory, the industrialization is 
regarded as a stage of the economies evolutions, in which the industrial sector achieves 
the supremacy over the agrarian one (e.g. O’Brien, 2001). Usually, this process has 
substantial social consequences such as the urbanization, the rising of the working class 
or a new women’s role in the society (e.g. Blumer, 1990). Very often, the industrialization 
has a significant impact on the environment by increasing the pollution (e.g. Baumol and 
Oates, 1988). 
There are significant particularities of the industrialization process in the Eastern 
Europe.  Since the Late Middle Ages, the Western Europe developed much faster than the 
Eastern Europe. While in the Western Europe the Industrial Revolution started in the 
second half of the XVIIIth century, in the countries of the Eastern Europe it occurred much 
later and it was affected by establishing the communist regimes (e.g. Brenner, 1991).  
For Marx (1867) the communism could triumph only after the industrialization had 
consolidated the proletariat. However, the first country which experienced a communist 
regime was Russia, where the agrarian sector was still predominant. In 1917 the 
Bolsheviks conquered the power and, five years later, established the Soviet Union. In the 
economic activity of the new country they imposed the principles of the state ownership 
and centralized administrative planning (e.g. Davies, 1998). The industrialization was 
accelerated by discretionary measures specific to an authoritarian regime. After the 
Second World War, the Eastern Europe countries occupied by the Red Army became 
Soviet Union’s satellites. For a long period of time, the puppet communist regimes from 
these countries had to follow the principles of industrialization applied in Soviet Union (e.g. 
Berend, 2003). 
In this paper we approach an episode of the socialist industrialization in Eastern 
Europe: the choice of Galati, a town from the South – East of Romania, as a location for a 
gigantic steel works. This decision provided a turning point for the history of Galati with 
substantial economic, social and environmental consequences. The building of the new 
steel mill, named “Combinatul Siderurgic Galati” (CSG), began in 1961 and it lasted for 
more than two decades (although the production started in 1965). In the 1980s CSG was 
the largest industrial complex from Romania, responsible for more than a half of the 
national crude steel production.  
The rest of this paper is organized as it follows: the second part presents some 
particularities of the industrialization in countries with communist regimes, the third part 
approaches the role of Gheorghe Gheorghiu – Dej (the leader of the Romanian 
Communists when the decision was made), the fourth part describes the circumstances of 
choosing the location for the steel works, the fifth part presents the Soviet Union’s position 
about CSG, the sixth part approaches the consequences of the decision and the seventh 
part concludes. 
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INDUSTRIALIZATION UNDER COMMUNIST REGIMES 
In the countries with communist regimes the industrialization was marked by the 
absolute control of the governments. The visions of the communist leaders on the role of 
the industrialization had a significant impact on this process.  
In 1920, when Russia was still affected by the civil war ended, the Bolsheviks 
launched GOELRO, a plan intended to introduce the electrification of the whole country. 
For Lenin (1920) the electrification of Soviet Russia was a necessary stage for the 
Communism triumph since “the industry couldn’t develop without electrification”.  
After Lenin’s death in 1924, the Bolsheviks leaders were involved in a power 
struggle which ended with Josef Stalin’s victory. He implemented an accelerated 
industrialization which, however, was more moderate comparing to those proposed by the 
“Left Opposition” led by Leon Trotsky. The investments were directed with priority to the 
heavy industry and large industrial complexes. The new plants efficiency was affected by 
the fact that their workers were, in large proportions, ex-peasants who lacked an industrial 
experience. Very often, unrealistic quotas were imposed and those who failed to fulfill 
them were accused by sabotage.  
At the end of the Second World War, Stalin established a strict control over the 
communist regimes imposed to the Eastern Europe countries occupied by the Red Army. 
Their leaders were asked to introduce the same type of industrialization that he had 
implemented in Soviet Union.  
The death of Josef Stalin, in 1953, brought significant changes in the prospects of 
the socialist countries industrialization. In August 1953, Georgy Malenkov, the new prime 
minister of Soviet Union (who was considered then Stalin’s successor), proposed a new 
economic policy with more investments for the light industry than for the heavy one. This 
new orientation of industrialization came under attack from the First Secretary of the 
Central Committee of Soviet Union Communist Party, Nikita Khruhschev, who compared it 
with Nikolai Bukharin and Aleksey Rykov “right deviation”. Against Malenkov new industrial 
policy, Khruhschev gained the support of the military that worried about the consequences 
on the arms production. However, after Khruhschev had defeated Malenkov he adopted 
some of his rival’s policies including those on industrialization (e.g. Tompson, 1997). 
Khruhschev wasn’t able to keep the strict control that Stalin applied on the Eastern 
European communist regimes. Instead, he intended to influence their economic policies by 
strengthening the role of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance which 
reunited the Soviet Union and its satellites from Eastern Europe). 
In the early 1960s Khruhschev supported the idea of a specialization among the 
members of COMECON. In this vision the economies of already industrialized countries 
such as East Germany or Czechoslovakia had to be oriented mainly toward the industrial 
production, while the economies of the less industrialized countries, such as Bulgaria and 
Romania, had to focus mainly on the agriculture. This initiative was received with hostility 
by the Romanian communists who had already launched ambitious projects of 
industrialization. 
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THE ROLE OF GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ 
 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej spent most of his youth in Galati. In the 1930s he joined 
the Communist Party of Romania, becoming its General Secretary in 1944. A cunning and 
merciless politician, under an appearance of blandness, he could show patience and 
tenacity in fulfilling his objectives.  
In 1944, when the Red Army occupied their country, the Romanian communists 
were insignificant as popularity. However, with the massive support of Soviet Union, they 
managed, step by step, to take over the power. In 1948, Romanian Communist Party 
merged with Romanian Social Democratic Party and took the name of Romanian Workers’ 
Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Roman - PMR). In the same year, a communist regime, 
controlled strictly by Soviet Union, was established in Romania. At the beginning, although 
Gheorghiu – Dej was the nominal leader of PMR, he had to share the power with other 
rivals, especially with those from the so-called “muscovite faction”, which reunited 
Romanian communists who had found a refuge in Soviet Union during the war.  
Soon after he had imposed Soviet Union’s puppet regimes in the occupied 
countries, Stalin urged their leaders to implement accelerated industrializations. In 
Romania there were some particularities induced by the different economical evolutions of 
its regions. Two regions, Transylvania and Banat, which had belonged to the former 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, were more developed and industrialized than the others. For 
some Romanian communist leaders the new industrialization could be an opportunity to 
attenuate such differences. According to Gheorghe Apostol (1998), one of his most trusted 
collaborators, in the latest 1940s Gheorghiu – Dej proposed to develop the South-East of 
Romania, which was then a mainly agrarian region, by building of a steel mill at Galati. 
However, Ana Pauker, the leader of the muscovite faction, opposed to this proposal 
accusing Gheorghiu – Dej of “local patriotism” (through this expression she insinuated that 
the General Secretary intended to favor the town of his youth). In this period of time 
Gheorghiu – Dej hadn’t enough influence to impose his idea and he had to abandon it. 
However, soon, the balance of power was modified in his favor. The anti-Zionism 
campaign initiated by Stalin in the early 1950s undermined the position of the muscovite 
faction (Ana Pauker had Jews origins) which was annihilated in 1952-1953. In June 1952 
Gheorghiu – Dej became Romania’s prime minister. 
After the death of Stalin, in 1953, the Romanian communists had to watch carefully 
the evolution from the Soviet Union leadership. In the context of the new industrial policy 
promoted by Malenkov a decision on building a new steel mill could be too risky. In fact, in 
this period of time, the Romanian Government relaxed its objectives on the heavy industry, 
assigning instead more important roles to the light industry and to agriculture. 
Between April 1954 and October 1955, following the recommendations from 
Moscow regarding the separation among the Party and Government functions, Gheorghiu 
– Dej renounced to the position of PMR’s General Secretary in favor of his loyal aid, 
Gheorghe Apostol. It was just a movement to induce the appearance of a collective 
leadership; in fact Gheorghiu – Dej kept the real power on PMR. In 1956, soon after 
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gaining the predominant position in the “collective leadership” of the Communist Party of 
Soviet Union, Nikita Khruhschev delivered, at the 20th Congress, the secret speech “On 
the Cult of Personality and its Consequences” criticizing Stalin’s methods. The so-called 
“De – Stalinization” process represented a threat for the leaders of Eastern European 
communist regimes, since they had been highly involved in Stalin’s Cult of Personality. In 
Romania, two of the former Gheorghiu – Dej’s collaborators, Iosif Chisinevschi and Miron 
Constantinescu, saw the De – Stalinization as an opportunity to overthrow him. However, 
the majority of the PMR leaders remained loyal to Gheorghiu – Dej, criticizing the so-called 
“Chisinevschi - Constantinescu factionalist group” (Tudor and Catanus, 2001). After this 
episode there was no contestation of Gheorghiu – Dej’s leadership of PMR until his death 
in 1964. However, although he enjoyed an almost absolute power he was very cautious to 
keep the appearance of a collective leadership on PMR. 
The PMR’s position in its relations with Soviet leaders has strengthened after the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956, when the Romanian communists provided a consistent 
help on the reorganization of Hungarian Working People's Party (Imre Nagy and his 
collaborators were detained in Romania for a short period of time). In 1958, Gheorghiu – 
Dej convinced Khruhschev to withdraw the Red Army from Romania. This achievement 
was followed by a gradual emancipation from Soviet Union’s tutelage (dissimulated by 
numerous statements of loyalty), while the commercial relations with capitalist countries 
were intensified (Stanciu, 2009).  
At the end of 1950s Gheorghiu – Dej was able to determine the building of a steel 
mill at Galati. However, he acted cautionary in order to avoid suspicions that he favored 
the town of his youth. 
 
CHOOSING THE LOCATION FOR THE NEW STEEL WORKS 
 
The circumstances of choosing Galati as location for the new steel works can be 
described by three aspects: 
a. the role of the technical constraints; 
b. the economic development of the two towns selected for the location; 
c. the choice between Braila and Galati. 
 
a. The role of the technical constraints. In his cautionary style, Gheorghiu – Dej 
started by initiating discussions in technical commissions about the building of a new steel 
mill in the South-East of Romania. During these discussions there were revealed some 
technical constraints used in the location selection (e.g. Apostol, 1998). First, the 
technologies used in the steel production consumed large quantities of water, so the new 
industrial complex had to be placed near significant rivers. Second, in the initial plan, it 
was supposed that steel works would be supplied by iron ore from Krivoi Rog (in Soviet 
Union) and by coal and metallurgical coke from Donbas (also in Soviet Union). Therefore, 
the location had to be directly linked by railways to Soviet Union. Third, to facilitate the 
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transport of other raw materials and the steel production, the new industrial complex 
should be near a port. Analyzing these conditions, the specialists came to the conclusion 
that only two towns from the South – East of Romania could fulfill them: Galati and Braila 
(another port town to Danube).  
b. The economic development of the two towns selected for the location. 
Galati and Braila are closely located and their histories have some similarities. Historical 
sources from the Late Middle Ages mentioned both of them as important harbors of the 
two principalities from the actual territory of Romania: Galati for Moldavia and Braila for 
Walachia. Their development was affected by the expansion of the Ottoman Empire which 
imposed, in the XVth century, its suzerainty over the two principalities. In 1484, after the 
sultan Bayezid II captured the two important fortresses of Kilia and Cetatea Alba, Galati 
remained the single Moldavian port. In the XVIth century the Ottoman Empire annexed 
Braila transforming it in a kaza. The Ottomans strengthened their domination over 
Moldavia and Walachia increasing their economic spoliation, so the two principalities 
became the Turkish Empire’s granaries (a quasi monopoly on the commerce of the two 
countries was established). As Danubian ports, Galati and Braila were largely involved in 
the shipment of grain and cattle from the two principalities to the Constantinople and other 
Ottoman towns. In this context, many Levantine merchants came to the two ports giving 
them a cosmopolite profile. 
Beginning with the XVIIIth century the rise of Russia and the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire changed the balance of power in the South-Eastern Europe. Victorious in wars 
against Turkey, Russia aimed to extend its influence over the Danubian Principalities 
(Moldavia and Walachia). In 1774, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca allowed Russia to act on 
behalf of Eastern Orthodox communities from the Ottoman Empire. After another 
victorious war against the Turkey, Russia received, from the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, 
the protectorate over the Danubian Principalities, in fact an almost absolute control over 
the two countries despite the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire (this protectorate 
had been stipulated in the 1826 Russo – Turkish Akkerman Convention which wasn’t 
ratified by the Sultan Mahmud II). Turkey’s monopoly over the Danubian Principalities 
commerce was abolished and Braila was reincorporated in Walachia. Russia also gained 
the mouths of the Danube and free passage for merchant ships through the Dardanelles. 
In the occupied Danubian Principalities, Russia initiated economic and political reforms 
that opened a road of modernization and westernization for Romania.   
The abolishment of Turkey’s commercial monopoly was a catalyst for a spectacular 
development of the two ports. The imports of various industrial goods and the exports of 
cereals, most of them to Western European market, flourished. In 1831 almost a half of 
Moldavia’s imports occurred through Galati (e.g. Buse, 1976). The free port status gain, in 
1836 for Braila and in 1837 for Galati, accelerated the economic growth of the two towns. 
The promising economic perspectives attracted many Western European entrepreneurs 
and consular missions. In this period of time Braila and Galati were important bridgeheads 
for the modernization and westernization of the Danubian Principalities (e.g. Zeletin, 
1925). 
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In 1856, a coalition formed by France, the British Empire, the Kingdom of Piedmont-
Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire defeated Russia in the Crimean War. In the same year, 
at the Treaty of Paris, the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities was 
replaced by the tutelage of Turkey and the Great European Powers. Russia also lost the 
mouths of the Danube, returned to the Ottoman Empire, and the south of Bessarabia, 
returned to Moldavia. It was decided the internationalization of the Danube under the 
supervision of some European commissions (the most important of them, European 
Commission of the Danube, was seated at Galati). In 1859, Moldavia and Walachia united 
under the name United Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia, changed in Romania after 
1862.  
In 1878, after another war in which had fought with Russia against Turkey, Romania 
gained its independence confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin. Romania also received the 
Northern Dobruja (in exchange for the south of Bessarabia taken by Russia), a province 
which granted the access to the Black Sea. There, after the Crimean War, a British 
Company started the building of a modern harbor at Kustenjie (renamed Constanta by the 
Romanian authorities), which accompanied the Ottoman government’s efforts to 
modernize the Danubian Vilayet which included Dobruja. The Romanian government 
continued the building of Constanta’s port, investing substantial resources in its 
modernization. At the end of the XIXth century, the competition from Constanta affected 
the Danubian ports’ activity (Kontogeorgis, 2016). Moreover, in 1883, Braila and Galati lost 
their free port status. However, the two towns continued to develop in the XXth century 
and their industries diversified (e.g. Ardeleanu, C., 2008).  
Since the end of World War II when Romania fell in the Soviet Union’s sphere of 
influence, Braila and Galati couldn’t serve as cereals exports outlets for Western markets. 
Added to the ravages of the war (in 1944, many of buildings from Galati were destroyed by 
air raids and by the retreating German Army), this fact led to a significant decline of their 
industries.   
c. Choice between Braila and Galati. The most important episode of the decision 
about the new steel works location was a meeting of three representatives of the Political 
Bureau of PMR Central Committee and a group of specialists in industrial buildings, led by 
Professor Aurel A. Beles. From the Political Bureau of Central Committee of PMR 
participated: 
- Gheorghe Gheorghiu – Dej, the General Secretary of PMR; 
- Chivu Stoica, the Prime Minister of Romania; 
- Gheorghe Apostol, the Chairman of the Trade Unions Central Council. 
Chivu Stoica owed his political career to the unconditional obedience to Gheorghiu 
– Dej, while Gheorghe Apostol was one of the most trusted collaborators of the General 
Secretary of PMR (like Gheorghiu – Dej, he spent his youth in Galati). In these 
circumstances, the choice of Galati could be considered as sure. However, according to 
Apostol (1998), there was a moment when the discussion evaluated in favor of Braila. 
Some specialists warned that the ground loess from Galati could put in danger the 
industrial buildings and the Prime Minister Stoica seemed to supports their arguments. At 
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this point, Gheorghiu – Dej interfered in discussions. At his demand, Aurel Beles 
proposed, for surpassing the problem of the ground loess, the expensive and complex 
solution of the indirect foundation on load-bearing piles (e.g. Beles et al., 1977). This 
ended, practically, the discussions and a consensus between the specialists and the 
representatives of PMR’s leadership seemed to be achieved. In the later stages of the 
decision making the solution of Galati as the location for the steel works met no opposition. 
It was presented in the Political Bureau of Central Committee of PMR and then approved 
in a plenary session of Central Committee of PMR. After that, at the Third Congress of 
PMR, from 20 – 28 June 1960, Gheorghiu Dej announced, accompanied by the 
participants’ ovations, the plan for building the new steel works in Galati. Finally, the 
Romanian Government issued a decree on. It was planned that the building of CSG 
should last ten years (although the partial production had to start in about five years) and, 
after that, the steel production should reach 4 million metric tons. 
   
THE SOVIET UNION’S PERSPECTIVE ON CSG  
 
At the Third Congress of PMR, Gheorghiu – Dej (1961) expressed the Romanian 
leaders’ gratitude “to comrade Khruhschev and Soviet Government for their fraternal 
support in building the new steel works”. In his speech, he announced that for the phase of 
execution the Romanian specialists would cooperate with their Soviet colleagues and the 
Soviet Union would deliver two units of metallurgical rolling. For the phase of exploitation, 
Soviet Union would supply CSG with large quantities of iron ore, coal and metallurgical 
coke. In fact, the decision about CSG contradicted the vision on industrialization of the 
Soviet Union’s leaders from these times and Khruhschev’s plans for economic integration 
of COMECON countries materialized in the so called “division of labor within the socialist 
camp”. As a result, the support from Soviet Union was not as consistent as it was 
expected.  
According to the former Minister of Metallurgy, Gaston Marin (2000), he had to ask 
the approval of the Comecon Steel Commission and to get the cooperation of Gosplan, the 
institution responsible for the central planning of Soviet Union economy. While the 
approval of the Comecon Steel Commission was an easy task, he failed to obtain the 
planed supply of raw materials from Soviet Union. The president of Gosplan, Alexei 
Kosygin (who became, in 1964, the premier of the Soviet Union) warned Marin that the 
result would be “another Magnitogorsk” (Magnitogorsk is a Russian town where Stalin 
built, in 1930s, a gigantic steel works; Kosygin’s comment shows how the vision on 
industrialization of Stalin’s successors was changed). He refused the supply of iron ore 
and coal in the quantities asked by Romanian Government proposing, instead, to deliver 
pig iron which could be transformed in steel on the new plant.  
Kosygin’s proposal was in line with the division of labor within the socialist camp 
promoted by Khruhschev, but the Romanian communists regarded that as a threat on their 
development plans and refused it. They had to find new sources for raw materials, some of 
them from capitalist countries (India, Australia, Brazil etc.).  
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Only a small proportion of industrial installations were provided by the Soviet Union 
(a unit of metallurgical rolling in the 1960s and, in the 1970s, some installations for 
metallurgical coke production). Most of the equipments were imported from Western 
countries thanks to the commercial relations with capitalist countries that Gheorghiu – Dej 
had initiated. 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION 
 
The building of CSG substantially changed Galati. The consequence of the strategic 
decision could be dissociated in three categories: 
a. economic consequences; 
b. social consequences; 
c. environmental consequences. 
 
a. Economic consequences. In the analysis of the economic results of a strategic 
decision on industrialization should be taken into consideration three stages of CSG’s 
evolution: 
i. the stage of the communist regime; 
ii. the pre-privatization stage; 
iii. the post-privatization stage. 
 
i. CSG during the communist regime. In 1950s, the most important segment of 
the Galati economy still consisted in the port activities. CSG dramatically changed the 
structure of the town economy which became dominated by the steel production. In 1965 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu – Dej died (for few years after his death CSG took his name) and he 
was succeeded by Nicolae Ceausescu who ruled Romania until 1989. Ceausescu 
launched ambitious strategies for the national economy development, including the steel 
industry. The steel production grew from 4.1 million metric tons in 1967 to 13.2 million 
metric tons in 1980 (Table 1).   
 
Tab. 1. Steel production of Romania from 1967 to 2014 
- million metric tons – 
Year 1967 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014 
Steel 
production 
4.1 13.2 9.754 4.672 3.9 3.16 
 
       Source of data: World Steel Association 
 
The plans on CSG’s building were modified by increasing its production capacity. In 
1973 it was finalized an installation for producing metallurgical coke and, in 1978, it was 
build the fifth blast furnace of CSG with a capacity of 2700 cubic metres. In a speech from 
1985, Ceausescu appreciated that until then Romania had invested in CSG about 60 
billions lei (“leu” is Romania’s national currency; in those times in Romania there were 
VANGUARD SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS IN MANAGEMENT, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016, ISSN 1314-0582 
 
applied multiple exchange rates that varied from 15 to 30 lei per an US dollar) and this 
huge amount  “should return to Romanian people”. 
 
Tab. 2. Indicators of CSG production between 1970 and 1988 
- million metric tons – 
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 
Steel production 1.885 3.715 5.875 6.830 7.700 
Iron pig 
production 
1.600 3.169 5.379 6.009 6.450 
Metallurgical 
coke production 
x 1.189 1.913 3.171 3.400 
Source of data: Combinatul Siderurgic Galati, 1988. CSG pe coordonatele dezvoltarii.  
 
The Table 2 presents the evolution of some indicators of CSG’s production as 
offered by a book issued in 1988 by the firm’s management. Although this data has to be 
taken with precautions since in those times the economic results were often mystified for 
propagandistic reasons, it is a reality that the production growth was spectacular. A large 
part of it was assigned to be exported.  
It is hard to analyze the enterprises efficiency in a socialist economy where the 
prices are arbitrary established. Moreover, the mystification of the economic results made 
difficult the comparisons between costs and prices. Even so, official reports admitted that 
the electric energy consume was too high comparing to the western still mills. In the 
assessment of CSG’s economic performances it has to be mentioned its contribution to 
the commercial balance in a period when Romania’s government needed resources of 
strong currencies to finance its investments. CSG had large exports but also large imports.  
In 1981, facing the external debt crisis, Nicolae Ceausescu decided drastic 
measures, to increase exports and to reduce imports, that affected Romanian enterprises. 
The exporters were favored in comparison with other firms regarding the delivery of 
electricity or raw materials. Many plants were forced to replace the imports with raw 
materials produced in Romania. CSG was a special case, being a big importer but also a 
big exporter. Moreover, many other Romanian exporters depended on its steel production. 
Technically, it was impossible for CSG to renounce at the imports of iron ore and coal. 
However, it became very difficult to import new technologies. The local and central 
authorities applied pressure on CSG’s management to increase the exports. In 1980s 
Romania was often accused by dumping the prices of its exported steel production. 
 
ii. SIDEX during the pre-privatization stage. After the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu’s 
regime, in 1989, Romania passed in a long period of transition to the market economy. 
Formally, CSG was transformed in a shares company (SIDEX S.A.) but it remained, for a 
long time, a state-owned enterprise. The entities that coordinated and controlled the 
industry during the communist regimes were eliminated or replaced by inefficient 
institutions. As a result, the management of the state-owned enterprise was poor, exposed 
to political intervention and to political corruption. It was a typical phenomenon for the 
Eastern European countries in transition (e.g. Aghion et al., 1994).  
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In the 1990s, as many other Romanian companies that couldn’t adapt to the market 
economy, SIDEX S.A. accumulated huge losses. There were accusations (in general not 
proved in justice) that these losses were caused in large proportions by some “parasite” 
firms who bought the steel cheap from SIDEX. These firms were controlled by local 
politicians or even by managers of SIDEX (e.g. Culcer, 2007). Despite the growing losses, 
the Romanian Governments that succeeded in the 1990s didn’t privatize or restructure the 
steel mill from Galati, justifying their hesitation by its strategic importance for the national 
economy. In those years, SIDEX accumulated huge debts to its suppliers and to the 
national system of social securities (there were also numerous Romanian enterprises 
which didn’t pay for the steel supplied by SIDEX). The managers of Galati steel works 
didn’t act to pay these debts, considering them as subsidies their enterprise were entitled 
to receive. In these years, they viewed SIDEX as “too big to fail” and didn’t act to stop the 
losses. However, at the end of 1990s the negative results of SIDEX reached unbearable 
levels. In 1998 and 1999 the payment of the workers’ wages had to be delayed to the fury 
of the employees. In order to avoid social conflicts, the Government asked a large state-
owned bank (Banca Comerciala Romana - BCR) to offer a substantial loan to Galati steel 
works. Other debts accumulated and instead of paying them, SIDEX managers proposed 
debt/equity swaps. At the beginning of 2000s it was obvious that the Romanian authorities 
had two solutions for SIDEX: a radical reorganization or the privatization. 
 
iii. ArcelorMittal Galati during the post-privatization stage. In 2001, the shares 
detained by the state at SIDEX S.A. were sold to LNM Holdings NV, one of the world's 
largest steel producers, registered in the Dutch Antilles and controlled by the Indian 
magnate Lakshmi Niwas Mittal and his family. It is still a controversial decision since it is 
very difficult to quantify the real value of SIDEX SA in these times when the huge values of 
the assets were accompanied by huge debts (e.g. Brittain - Catlin, 2005). In 2004, LNM 
Holdings NV was bought by Ispat International N.V. (another company controlled by 
Lakshmi Mittal) which changed its name to Mittal Steel Company N.V. Then, in 2006, 
Mittal Steel merged with other big steel producer, Arcelor S.A., forming a new company, 
ArcelorMittal S.A. In 2006, SIDEX S.A. name was changed to ArcelorMittal Galati. The 
new owner restructured SIDEX SA by closing a large part of the industrial installations, 
reducing the personnel and introducing some new technologies. However, the efforts to 
obtain efficiency were hampered by the 2007 – 2009 Great Recession that reduced the 
demand of steel. Moreover, in the last years, European steel producers are affected by the 
competition of China’s cheap production.  
 
b. Social consequences. The building of CSG was one from the main factors of 
the spectacular growth of Galati population in the second half of the XXth century. The 
accelerated industrialization generated a significant ascendant trend of the Romanian 
towns’ population evolutions. However, for Galati, the number of people grew with a 
rhythm that surpassed the medium level for Romania. For comparison, the population of 
Braila also increased but more slowly than the one of Galati (Table 3).  
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Tab. 3. Evolutions of populations of Galati and Braila from 1948 to 2011 
Year 1948 1956 1966 1977 1992 2002 2011 
Galati 80411 95646 151415 238292 326141 298861 249732 
Braila 95514 102500 138802 194633 234110 216292 180302 
Source of data: National Institute of Statistics, Romania 
 
New neighborhoods were built for the workers of CSG and many connected entities 
were established (a company assigned to build industrial facilities, a metallurgical 
industrial planning and research institute, a port specialized for raw materials etc.). The 
heating of the town was provided by the industrial installations of CSG. As it happened 
quite often in the industrialization under a communist regime, important resources supplied 
by the central administration for the building of CSG were assigned, from the decisions of 
local communist leaders, to finance various social objectives: schools, pocket parks, 
recreation centers, a skater etc. (e.g. Sageata, 2013). 
In the 1980s CSG employed about 35000 workers, while the connected enterprises 
employed about 15000 workers. Most of them came from the rural area and their 
adaptation to urban life proved to be long and very difficult, to dissatisfaction of the older 
inhabitants. A large part of CSG’s workers were commuters from the South of Moldavia’s 
counties. The conditions of work in CSG were hard but the employees were rewarded with 
wages that surpassed the average level.  
The relations between CSG’s management and the local structures of the 
Romanian Communist Party were complex. Formally, the leadership of a local 
organization of the Communist Party had authority over the enterprises on its territory. 
However, the importance of CSG in the national economy gave a significant power to its 
manager. In the 1980s, the Managing Director of CSG was also the deputy of the ministry 
of metallurgy and member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.  
There were situations when CSG’s management disobeyed the orders from the 
Communist Party’s organization of Galati County, such as the demand to offer enterprise’s 
workers for agriculture tasks. In fact, the building of CSG created in Galati a new center of 
power able to compete with the Communist Party’s local structure. 
In the 1980s, the austerity measures applied by Ceausescu, in order to repay the 
external debt, reduced the Romanians’ standard of living. The shortage of consumer 
goods, especially food, affected the inhabitants of country’s towns. In Galati the supply 
with consumer goods was better than in other towns, perhaps because the authorities 
considered that the large community of CSG’s workers had a significant potential of revolt. 
The transition to the market economy generated significant changes for CSG’s 
workers. In the 1990s, Romanian Governments hesitation to restructure SIDEX S.A., 
spared Galati by the social problems that appeared in other towns where industrial units 
were closed. In these years population of Galati voted, in majority, for the left-wing political 
parties that rejected radical economic reforms. Moreover, the workers from SIDEX 
participated to the so-called “June 1990 Mineriad”, when the left-wing Government 
organized a brutal repression of the opposition (Balanescu, 2015). In fact, in the 1990s, 
Galati was nicknamed “The Red Town”. The community of employees from SIDEX 
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couldn’t be neglected in the electoral processes. From 2000 to 2012, a former Managing 
Director of SIDEX served three terms as the mayor of Galati. 
The corruption that undermined the efficiency of SIDEX was viewed with indulgence 
by its workers as long as Government financed the losses and their wages weren’t 
affected. It was a typical phenomenon for the transition in former socialist states (Wallace 
and Latcheva, 2006). In fact, some of the fortunes created by corruption were invested in 
commercial activities stimulating the economic growth of Galati.  
After the privatization, the number of employees of SIDEX dramatically dropped 
from about 27000 in 2001 to less than 6500 at the end of 2015. In this context, the 
population of Galati experienced a significant decrease from 2002 to 2011 (Table 3). 
 
c. Environmental consequences. The technologies employed in the steel 
production were air, water and soil pollutant. The coking works and the blast furnaces 
polluted significantly the air of Galati. The waste water from CSG’s production affected two 
lakes near Galati: Catusa and Malina. The store of slang in inappropriate conditions 
polluted the soil. The management of CSG and the local authorities weren’t very 
preoccupied with those problems and, as a result, in the 1970s and in the 1980s, Galati 
was one of the most polluted towns from Romania.  
In the recent years, the closing of several industrial installations and the introduction 
of new technologies reduced substantially the pollution. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The decision on building the CSG should be analyzed in the context of 
industrialization under a communist regime. In these days, when neo-liberal doctrines are 
largely applied in economic policies, it is difficult to imagine a Romanian Government 
investing huge financial resources to create a gigantic industrial complex. Moreover, it is 
unbelievable that a leader of a Party would be able to direct such investment to a town he 
sympathized. In choosing between Braila and Galati as a location for the new working 
steels Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej’s intervention was decisive to neutralize the specialists’ 
warning about the ground loess problem, despite the significant costs implied by the 
solution of indirect foundation on load-bearing piles. 
Some of the changes induced by the building of CSG seem to be irreversible. 
Galati, which in the XIXth century was a bridgehead for the modernization and 
westernization of the Danubian Principalities, is today an industrial town with inhabitants 
that usually vote for left-wing parties. In these circumstances it is hard to resist to the 
temptation of the counterfactual history in approaching the strategic decision on the steel 
works. How Galati would look today if the CSG wasn’t built? The experience of Braila 
could help in finding an answer. The neighboring town was also substantially transformed 
by the socialist industrialization although not so deep as Galati. In both towns the port 
activities were in decline before the communist regime and had to be replaced by 
something else.  
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In the present, uncertainty about the future of ArcelorMittal Galati, in the difficult 
context for the steel industry, should concern the authorities from Galati. Although the 
number of employees was drastically reduced in the last years, they and their families still 
represent a significant segment of the town’s population. A future decline of ArcelorMittal 
Galati couldn’t be excluded and it has to be met by adequate solutions.  
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